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"Don't Talk of Fairness": The Chicago School's
Approach Toward Disciplining Professional Athletes
ROBERT

H. HEIDT*

Professional athletes excluded or disciplined by their sporting association
or league have challenged the action against them on antitrust grounds
successfully. Many of you know the examples: Jane Blalock suspended by
the Ladies Professional Golf Association for moving her ball illegally and
not reporting it;' Spencer Haywood excluded from the NBA based on its2
rule against employing players during the first four years after high school;
Kenneth Linseman excluded by the World Hockey League based on its rule
against drafting players under the age of twenty.' Of course, some disciplined
players have lost their antitrust cases: the Neeld case upholding the National
Hockey League's rule against one-eyed players; 4 the Manok case upholding
a bowling association's suspension of a bowler who had fraudulently manipulated his handicap; 5 the Deeson case upholding the PGA's exclusion of
a golfer who had not won sufficient tournaments to qualify for a PGA
event. 6 The grandaddy of all these cases was also a loser for the player: the
for betting
Molinas case upholding the NBA's lifetime exclusion of a player
7
on games and recruiting others in a point-shaving scheme.
One could confidently extend these examples of the discipline of human
athletes to cases where trotting horses were suspended from races, 8 or Angus
bulls were suspended from Angus bull exhibitions. 9 One could extend these
examples still further and apply my comments to cases where sports associations have excluded products from sanctioned events with the result that
the products compete at a substantial disadvantage compared to sanctioned
products. These examples include the Guntner Hartz case based on the U.S.
Tennis Association's refusal to allow spaghetti-strung rackets in USTA-sanctioned events,'" and the Polara Enterprises case based on the U.S. Golf
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1. Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
2. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
4. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
6. Deeson v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
846 (1966).
7. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
8. United States v. Unites States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,761 (S.D.
Ohio).
9. McCreary Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd
mem., 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
10. Gunter Hartz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Association's refusal to allow a certain kind of golf ball in USGA-sanctioned
events."
These opinions reveal that a court is likely to acknowledge an antitrust

issue upon finding concerted conduct, an effect on interstate commerce, and
a plaintiff who has been put at a significant competitive disadvantage to his

rivals.' 2 Upon making these formalistic findings, the courts clearly display
concern with the fairness of the sports association's action. Was the player's

behavior culpable in light of the community ethics within the sport, a key
issue in the Manok bowling case?' 3 Were fair procedures given the player
before he was disciplined, an obstacle fatal for the defendant American
Angus Society in the Angus bull case?'

4

Was the association biased, perhaps

because one of its members was a rival player who might gain from excluding
the plaintiff, or because it had too much discretion rather than being limited
by previously created rules, obstacles fatal to the Ladies Professional Golf
Association in the Blalock case? 5 Was the sports association's rule a rea-

sonable attempt to assure the integrity of the sports contest, a major factor
in the Molinas betting case?'

6

Was the rule correctly applied to the player;

that is, was the player guilty as charged? Was the disciplinary action excessive
in light of the player's conduct? In short, the courts will address whether

the association's action was "arbitrary," "unreasonable," or "unnecessary"
in light of alternative actions available, and such findings will virtually assure
victory for the plaintiff.'"
But now let us enter the rarified world of the Chicago School, soon to
be the world of antitrust analysis.' In that world, none of these concerns

II. Polara Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Golf Ass'n, No. 78-1320, slip op. (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 5, 1984).
12. The famous Supreme Court opinions indicating that an antitrust issue arises upon these
findings include: Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originators'
Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); and, most significantly, Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
13. Manok, 306 F. Supp. 1215.
14. McCreary Angus Farms, 379 F. Supp. 1008.
15. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. 1260.
16. Molinas, 190 F. Supp. 241.
17. E.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (restrictions
deemed "unnecessary" for group's legitimate purposes constitute an antitrust violation); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (exclusions deemed "arbitrary" constitute
an antitrust violation).
18. For background on the approach of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis toward
"group boycotts" such as sports discipline cases, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPEcarvE 207-10 (1976) (group boycotts illegal "when, and only when, they are employed
to enforce a practice that is objectionable on the basis of substantive antitrust policy"). See
also Liebeler, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 1.32, at 45-59 (C. Hills 2d ed. Supp. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Liebeler, ANTITRUST ADVISOR].
For the approach of the Chicago School generally, see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST (2d ed. 1981); Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near)Triumph
of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 319; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979); Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1317 (1979).

1985]

ANTITRUST AND AMATEUR SPORTS

matters to any significant extent. According to the Chicago School, it does
not matter that the exclusion of a player put him at a competitive disadvantage. It does not matter that the player was in fact innocent or that the
discipline was in retaliation for the player's collective bargaining efforts on
behalf of other players. Nor does it matter that the sports association failed
to give the player a hearing or other procedural protection. Nor does it
matter that the sports association's action was "arbitrary," or "unreasonable," or "unnecessary." What is sure under the Chicago School's antitrust
approach is that the player is very likely to lose and the association is very
likely to win.
Why do they display such indifference to the player's fate? To answer in
the most conclusory way, the Chicago School believes that antitrust laws
concern only allocative and productive efficiency, and that if the two conflict,
the court should strive for the result that yields the largest net economic
welfare.' 9 In other words, the court should balance the output-restricting
effects of the association's discipline-the harm to allocative efficiencyagainst the efficiency enhancing effects-the gain to production efficiency.
And in the joint action of forming an association and then excluding an
athlete from that association, the Chicago School is likely to see little harm
20
to allocative efficiency and substantial gain to productive efficiency.
How do they reach this conclusion? First, they see a sports association
as an integration of the productive facilities of those forming the association,
such as the teams and the players, to market the association's product,
namely the sporting events, broadcasts and related paraphernalia. Clearly
the successful marketing of this product is itself desirable, if only because
it intensifies competition with other products such as other sporting and
nonsporting events, other broadcasts and the like. Forming the association
also enhances efficiency because it increases the marketability of the generic
product that previously existed; that is, it increases the consumer's demand
schedule for this product compared to the demand schedule that would exist
absent the association's formation.
To be sure, forming the association also increases the ability to restrict
output by increasing the share of the generic product market controlled by
the firms forming the association. Thus, those forming the association increase their ability to fix the price for the sports events and to restrict the

19. Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1, 15 (1982).
20. This is true regardless of whether the association's action would be characterized under
the old antitrust law as a horizontal boycott, which occurs where rivals of the excluded player
imposed the discipline, or a vertical boycott, which occurs where non-rivals, such as a team
owner or other employer, imposed the discipline. Because characterizing the boycott as horizontal
under the old antitrust law greatly aided the player, I will discuss the Chicago School's approach
toward this kind of boycott, with the understanding that the player's case becomes still weaker,
a fortiori, whenever the conduct is characterized differently. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 92 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasizing the greater scrutiny appropriate for
"horizontal" boycott).
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number of events or the number of broadcasts short of the number that
would be produced in the perfectly competitive world. But this effect is only
a necessary incident to the main purpose of the integration, marketing a
product successfully or at least more successfully than without the integration. A glance at the real world should make clear that most modern sports
associations were formed in order to increase the marketability of the members' products and that these associations have in fact done so.
Second, the Chicago School sees little harm to output when a single athlete
is excluded from a sports association. In the case where the association
members are looked upon as employers of the athlete (and therefore related
to him vertically rather than horizontally), the agreement not to hire him
will be viewed as analogous to a monopsony, i.e., an agreement eliminating
rivalry between businesses in their purchase of inputs. The input here, the
player, will therefore be forced to devote his services to other uses in the
economy less highly valued than playing for the association's members. Thus,
the overall output from the player's services is reduced, and the association
members will not be offering the products consumers most desire. Unless
substitute associations and products emerge, consumers will spend their
money on goods or services which they desire less than they desire the
products the association would have produced absent the discipline. And
any collusively imposed restriction on the players that association members
can hire will tend to disturb allocative efficiency for the same reason. Therefore, it is not true that efficiency is completely unaffected when a player is
excluded. Indeed, a sweeping exclusion of the players whom fans would
most like to see, such as an absurd exclusion from professional football of
all players under the age of forty, would significantly reduce the output
from players' services, especially since the services of a player may have
substantially greater value in football than in the next best alternative use.
Such a sweeping exclusion would also significantly reduce the demand for
the association's products. On the other hand, the reduction in output from
excluding a single player is likely to be modest. Moreover, the association
only hurts itself when it excludes highly demanded players and reduces the
demand for its product. Thus, the association probably has some efficiencyenhancing reason for excluding the player which more than offsets the welfare
loss from the slight reduction in output.
Before discussing the efficiency-enhancing reasons for the discipline which
the Chicago School might see, I want to clarify that the Chicago School
does not infer harm to efficiency merely from the association's prominence
in the marketplace, from its ability to hurt the player severely, or from the
arbitrariness of its action. And this is true even if the association and the
player are viewed as horizontal competitors. For the Chicago School, the
key issue is whether the assocation's action increases the ability of the
association to fix prices or engage in some other practice that would significantly reduce output. The exclusion of a single player seems unrelated
to this ability. Nor does the danger of reduced output increase when the
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discipline was arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair, or when the effect of the
discipline was to put a player at a severe competitive disadvantage. Under
the Chicago School's view, the fact that one or more players might be denied
the opportunity to compete on equal terms has no necessary relationship
whatever to the question of whether the association's action restricts, or
increases the capacity of the association to restrict, output. The mere ability
of an association of firms to exclude other firms or their employees from
the market is not sufficient by itself to establish the existence of power to
restrict output. The harm to output must be gauged with reference to the
market in which the association's product is consumed, not with reference
to the players themselves. As long as requiring the association to let the
player play would not reduce the ability of the association to fix prices or
restrict output, the fact that the association treats players arbitrarily or
unfairly should not be a matter of concern to the antitrust laws. The question
of fairness to the players remains, of course. But since federal antitrust law
is to be concerned exclusively with questions of market efficiency, such
questions of "fairness" are to be addressed, if at all, only in another forum.2
In short, the Chicago School attacks the previous antitrust approach for
unduly emphasizing the injury to the player rather than the injury to competition.
And even if the discipline exacted upon the player caused a significant
reduction in output, the Chicago School will view it as ancillary to the
association's efficiency-enhancing aspects. Why? As Peter Gerhart, one proponent of the Chicago School, has explained, 22 the exclusion overcomes the
free-rider problem that would otherwise occur if the player were allowed to
impose costs on the other teams in the form of decreased reputation, without
having to compensate the other teams for those costs. Without the disciplinary action, one player whose actions decreased the reputation of the
association, as in the Molinas betting case, 23 will thereby impose costs on
the rest of the association for which he does not compensate. So if the
association does not act against the player, the player will have too much
incentive to engage in reputation-decreasing activities, and the rest of those
in the association will have insufficient incentive to engage in reputationenhancing activities. Thus, the association must be allowed to exclude the
player in order to insure an optimum investment level in reputation-enhancing
activities. Stating the same point in other language, the association must be
allowed to discipline these athletes in order to internalize the benefits of the
association's reputation-enhancing activities. The player's reputation-decreasing actions represent an externality the costs of which can be internalized

21. This is the approach called for by Professor Wesley Liebeler of UCLA, a major
proponent of the Chicago School. See Liebeler, ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 18.
22. Gerhart, supra note 18, at 339.
23. See Molinas, 190 F. Supp. 241.
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to the player by the disciplinary action. Overcoming the free-rider problem
will improve allocative efficiency through a more complete specification of
property rights so that every relevant cost or benefit is included in someone's
decisionmaking.
To summarize Gerhart's position, disciplining a player is efficiency-enhancing because it helps to provide optimum incentives for the association's
reputation-enhancing efforts. More generally, a sports association's action
would be efficiency-enhancing whenever it lowers the cost or increases the
demand for the products of the association or of its members.
Now notice the implications of Gerhart's position. One implication is that
an association could exclude any player whenever it thought the exclusion
would help to increase the marketability of its product. I take it then that
the U.S. Tennis Association could confidently have excluded Martina Navratilova if it thought she was such a dominant player (at least in 1983 and
1984) that the marketability of USTA events might increase without her.
Likewise, the National Football League could exclude with impunity a player
with a bad reputation regardless of whether the player had in fact done
anything to warrant the bad reputation. Players could be excluded because
of their off-the-field political activity or their unconventional lifestyle. In
short, any exclusion should be applauded if it aimed at increasing the appeal
of the sport in the eyes of the generally conservative professional sports fan.
And because we measure marketability not by counting the number of fans
but by counting the amount of dollars of demand offered for the league
products, the league might rationally exclude players who were generally
popular but who decrease the appeal of the league's product among particularly wealthy fans. Moreover, the Chicago School does not call for careful
judicial scrutiny of whether in fact the discipline of the athlete increased the
marketability of the sport. As long as that discipline does not increase the
association's ability to reduce output, courts should defer to the association
on the ground that it has incentive to, and superior knowledge about how
to, increase the marketability of its product, lower costs, and improve efficiency. 24
That someone might see the sports association's action in some of my
examples, like my Martina Navratilova example, as an encroachment on the
player's personal freedom or her right to pursue a vocation for which she
meets the game-related qualifications, means nothing to the Chicago School.
25
Their view of antitrust does not allow room for such notions.
This is not to suggest that a player will never have a chance at success
under the Chicago School's approach. I suppose that if a group like the

24. Liebeler, ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 18, at 54.
25. Protecting a person's ability to work at a lawful vocation was, however, a major goal
of the ancient common law action of restraint of trade. Case of the Tailors of Ipswitch, 11
Coke 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614) ("no man could be prohibited from working in any
lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness, the mother of all evil").
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U.S. Tennis Association disciplined a player for playing in too many tournaments, especially events not sponsored by the USTA, the discipline would
at least raise a close question. Arguably, the discipline does reduce the output
of tennis events, and I doubt the USTA could prevail by claiming that it
needs to control the number of player's appearances in order to create
optimum incentives for the organizers of the USTA.
The Chicago School might also agree that Spencer Haywood should have
won his case against the NBA. 26 The outcome would depend on whether the
NBA could put forth some plausible claim that their rule against hiring
those out of high school less than four years was efficiency-enhancing. The
NBA would need to suggest how the rule lowered cost, increased demand,
provided optimum investment incentives or otherwise facilitated a more
complete specification of property rights. My claim that defendants will
almost always win these cases springs from my firm belief that defendants
can always concoct some plausible efficiency-enhancing reason for their
action. For example, any exclusion of an especially vulnerable player, like
the NHL's rule against one-eyed players,2 7 can be defended by several efficiency-enhancing claims. The rule may reduce the amount of insurance for
injuries that the league needs to carry, thereby lowering costs. The rule may
enhance the reputation of the league and of its product by avoiding injuries
which would revolt its fans, thereby increasing demand. The Chicago School
approach invites a defense lawyer to search his imagination for a plausible
efficiency-enhancing story. And once the story is put forth, a court has no
effective way to evaluate it.28
Despite the possibility that the approach of the Chicago School would
not alter the result in some sports discipline cases, these cases bring into
relief the fundamental difference between the old approach in antitrust and
the Chicago School's approach. I call the old approach a tort approach
because it reflects concern for the individual player who may be mistreated
by the association and generally aims at allocating rights and duties between
players and associations. As Learned Hand once stated, antitrust law, like
tort law, calls on a judge "to appraise and balance the value of opposed
interests and to enforce [his] preference."129 In contrast, the Chicago School
approach reflects concern only for the consumers of the association's product. It emphasizes the freedom of the association to compose and market
its product as it sees fit. Just as it imposes no obligation on any other
business to treat its employees or independent contractors "fairly," it imposes
no such obligation on a sports association. It encourages prospective players
26. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049.
27. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315.
28. Others have pointed out the difficulty of evaluating the efficiency-enhancing and outputrestraining stories and of deciding the correct trade-off between them. E.g., Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1984).
29. Associated Press v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (1943) (L. Hand, J.).
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to view the association's actions and rules as exogenous factors. The players
have no rights vis-a-vis the association beyond those they contract for. Players
unwilling to accept the association's terms may seek another pursuit.
Now that we see the various approaches, how do we evaluate them? In
one sense there is no point in discussing which approach is more sound. If
you believe that balancing allocative and productive efficiency is the sole
goal of antitrust, the Chicago School's approach is more sound. If you think
one goal of antitrust should be the control of arbitrary business behavior
generally toward rivals, sellers, buyers and employees, the old approach is
more sound. Debating the matter resembles debating religion and usually
profits no one.
That being said, I cannot resist offering one observation through a philosophical, or, more accurately, a sociological aside. What the Chicago School
ignores is that a sports association is not just an efficiency-creating economic
organization. It is not just a form of integration that helps to organize a
sport and put forward a sporting product. It is not just one of many
competitive businesses seeking to maximize the marketability of its product.
In light of its substantial power to affect the lives of players, and in light
of its highly visible and representative role in American culture, it is also
what I will call a ruling organization. ° As such, it may not concern itself
only with profit maximization, but, like all ruling organizations, also needs
to concern itself with maintaining its legitimacy. As part of maintaining its
legitimacy, it needs at least to appear to treat players fairly. Indeed, since
the players have access to the mass media, creating the appearance of treating
players fairly probably requires treating them fairly in fact. And in popular
American culture, in particular American sports culture, treating a player
fairly requires allowing him to play regardless of his unpopularity, politics,
and dominance, even when these factors reduce the marketability of the
association's products; even when, in short, the player is "bad for the game."
On the other hand, "fair" treatment does not prevent the discipline of
criminals, cheaters, malingerers, certain gamblers, or drug addicts. Admittedly, the content of "fair" treatment in popular American culture will
change with times and fashions and cannot be proven.
A sports league is not the only aggregation of private economic power to
be a ruling organization. Some individual businesses are large enough and

30. Others have studied private regulatory regimes similar to those of sporting associations
with much more subtlety than is attempted here. Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1973); Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Object of Study, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 719 (1973); Zand &
Hair, The Social Control of General Hospitals, in ORGANIZATION RESEARCH ON HEALTH IN-

51-81 (B. Georgopoulos ed. 1972).
Although liberalism encourages us to think of rulemaking and enforcement as a function of

STITUTIONs

the "public sector," in fact we inhabit a world of legal pluralism where "private" units like
sports associations exercise what are, effectively, legal powers. Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y 149, 153 (1984).
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visible enough to amount to a ruling organization by themselves. Popular
language reflects the notion that these businesses have more obligations than
merely maximizing profits. The very concept "corporate responsibility," as
in the corporate responsibility of the television networks to refrain from
broadcasting pornographic programs, suggests that some businesses are expected by the culture to sacrifice profits in order to abide by the culture's
dominant noneconomic norms. In turn, abiding by those norms enhances
the ruling organization's legitimacy and helps to justify its claim to its wealth
and power.
In failing to see that a sports league has obligations beyond maximizing
profits, the Chicago School is not alone. All those who believe in liberalismthat is individualism-a group which includes, I suspect, most Americans
and almost all modern American lawyers, tend to be guilty of the same
oversight. They tend to divide the world between the government, which
has the power to make and enforce rules but which must observe the
constitutional protections given the unpopular, and private individuals who
do not have this power, who are subject to the government's rules but who
are generally free to profit maximize as they wish. This is the well known
public-private distinction. And in this world view there is no place for the
reality that some private groups acting in concert make rules and play a
part in ruling this nation. As Arthur S. Miller contends,
"neither our constitutional law nor our political theory is able to account
for the corporate presence in the arena of social power." . . . American
views of law ... are in the main based on Austinian notions of sovereignty, under which law is the command of the sovereign - that is,
the government.'
It is not surprising then that our law has waffled in dealing with the reality
that private groups rule and make rules. One judicial impulse is to refuse
to review private rule by ruling organizations entirely (except when output
is restrained and there is no efficiency-enhancing benefit), as the Chicago
School prescribes. Another impulse, for which Justice Black's antitrust opinions are famous, 32 is to prohibit concerted private rule regardless of its
31. A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 30 (1976) (quoting Hacker, Introduction:
CorporateAmerica, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 8 (A. Hacker ed. 1964)). See also Hacker,
Politics and the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER, supra; A. HACKER, THE END
OF THE AmERicAN ERA 72 (1970).

32. In Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), for instance,
Justice Black condemned the efforts of garment manufacturers to control style piracy with this
language:
the combination is in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules
for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra- judicial
tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus "trenches
upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute."
Id. at 465 (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899)). See
also American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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content on the ground that the private businesses are usurping the role of
the government. Such a prohibition, however, is wildly unrealistic in light
of the pervasive presence of private power, the inevitable need for private
groups to judge others, and the many economic and noneconomic benefits
which private rule can provide.33 Wisely, lower courts, especially in the
common law of torts 34 and in the old antitrust cases like Molinas,35 have
avoided both extremes. They have instead reviewed the reasonableness of
actions by private groups acting in concert just as they often review the
reasonableness of government actions. And, of course, this review of reasonableness does not ask only whether the private groups' actions were
output-restraining. Siding more with Justice Black, this review reflects hostility toward the exercise of private concerted power over the opportunities
of others and over the rights of others to pursue their vocation, regardless
of the effect of that power on industry output.
In fact, I suspect most lawyers would agree that a modern court faced
with an association's suspension of a player on clearly arbitrary grounds
would feel obliged to review that action, if not as part of antitrust, then at
least as part of tort, property, or contract law. If this suspicion is correct,
the old tort approach offered a more accurate insight into the attitudes of
courts than the Chicago School approach. The insight is simply that courts
are troubled when a private group acting in concert, like a sports association,
possesses too much power vis-a-vis another group, like the players, and then
acts to abuse that power. In contrast, the Chicago School's approach, like
all approaches which would present law as a science, invites courts to entertain the illusion attacked by Justice Holmes so long ago, the illusion that
courts are above the fray of groups striving for power. 6
Even those who reject this sociological view entirely may acknowledge
certain benefits from accepting the reality that private groups rule and that
courts, one way or another, are likely to review that rule. One benefit is
33. Any joint activity by potential rivals, including the formation of a partnership, joint
venture, or trade association, or the mere preparation of a joint statement about health or
safety standards, entails a "judgment" about whom to exclude from the joint activity. Whenever
this extra-judicial "judgment" puts some rival at a significant competitive disadvantage, the
joint activity would merit condemnation under Justice Black's sweeping language. See supra
note 32; see also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
In the language of public choice analysis, private regulation is to be preferred to government
regulation unless the transaction costs of promulgating the regulation privately become prohibitive or unless significant externalities exist. J. BUCHANAN, THE BASES FOR COLLECTIvE ACTION

(1971).

34. According to the First Restatement of Torts, liability for entering an agreement to
refuse to deal with another turns on whether the action is deemed "justified." Many noneconomic factors are considered including the degree of harshness to the plaintiff, the social
desirability of forcing the plaintiff to comply with the defendants' requirements, and the relative
economic power of the plaintiff and the defendants. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765 (1939);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766(b), 767, 768 (1977).
35. Molinas, 190 F. Supp. 241.
36. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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that courts might start to indicate more specifically which disciplinary actions
by a sporting association are appropriate. I believe a host of private associations would profit from the courts devising more specific guidelines for
their actions. Realtors who control admission to multiple listings services,
doctors who control the granting of staff privileges at private hospitals, and
trade association officers who control access to the association's advantages
would profit from safe-harbor guidelines indicating the procedures through
which, and substantive grounds on which, they may exclude a member
without fear of legal liability. A judicial effort to specify such guidelines
would not necessarily mean a bonanza for players or a headache for sports
associations. A court might acknowledge that the disciplinary actions serve
a variety of social purposes. For example, disciplinary actions can help to
enforce the criminal law, as in disciplinary actions for undue violence during
a sports event. The assault on Rudy Tomjanovich is one example.37 Government officials often consider it impractical to prosecute athletes for undue
38
violence, if only because of jury sympathy for members of the home team.
Thus, league action may be the only deterrent feasible. League disciplinary
action may also help to enforce customary morality, as in disciplinary action
based on verbally abusing an official during a contest. Here there is probably
no public law making the conduct criminal because the conduct is not so
widespread as to create an outcry for legislative action.
Those who insist on the public-private distinction of individualism, however, will find no sensible legal basis for a league trying to supplement the
criminal law or trying to enforce customary morality. After all, there is no
constitution giving the league any "police power" to pursue these ends. Nor
is there any other legal basis for asserting that league efforts to these ends
serve a social benefit. These believers in individualism face the extreme choice
referred to above: either adopt the Chicago School's view and leave ruling
organizations alone, or adopt Justice Black's view and condemn all private
rule which intrudes on the government's domain as long as concert of action
or some other formalistic requirement is present. Those who see beyond the
public-private distinction of individualism are most likely to understand why
a court might intervene only against league actions deemed "arbitrary" or
"unreasonable." 19
37. Tomjanovich was punched in the face and seriously injured while trying to stop a fight
between two other players during a professional basketball game. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
1981, at B18, col. 5.
38. Weistart, Player Discipline in ProfessionalSports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 703, 709 n.24, 728-29 n.91 (1977).
39. As Professor Macaulay has written:
the public/private distinction is suspect. While it may be useful or vital to carve
out areas of activity and put them beyond public control, reifying public and
private governments and seeing them as distinct entities only obscures reality.
S. MACAULAY, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 134 (1984) (forthcoming in the Handbook of Law and
Social Science to be published under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council;
currently available at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School).
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My more mundane conclusions are that when the Chicago School's triumph
is complete, the antitrust laws will rarely offer a remedy for a player who
is disciplined. Instead, the player will need to hope courts fashion a tort,
contract, or property remedy for him. If only because the tort, property,
and contract law in this area is utterly undeveloped, players will need to be
especially creative in suggesting the elements and limits of the proposed
common law actions. Players may also want to consider bringing these actions
in state courts; for even if federal courts find jurisdiction, they will hesitate
to create new common law actions under state law before the state courts
have addressed the matter. And, of course, even if courts do create new
actions in tort or property law to help the players, the actions will not carry
with them the advantages of treble damages, attorney's fees, federal jurisdiction or any of the other substantive and procedural advantages of the
antitrust laws. Thus, the effect of the Chicago School's forthcoming triumph
is to put a premium on collective bargaining by players' associations, and
a premium, therefore, on an individual player keeping in the good graces
of his collective bargaining unit.

